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A CHARACTERIZATION OF INTERIM EFFICIENCY
WITH PUBLIC GOODS
BY JOHN O. LEDYARD AND THOMAS R. PALFREY1
1. INTRODUCTION
IN THIS PAPER, WE CONSIDER the following classical public goods problem. A group of
individuals must decide on a level of a public good that is produced according to constant
returns to scale up to some capacity constraint. In addition to deciding the level of public
good, the group must decide how to tax the individuals in the group in order to cover the
cost. The distribution of the burden of taxation is important because different individuals
Ž .have different marginal rates of substitution between the private good taxes and the
public good, and may have different incomes as well. These individual marginal rates of
substitution are private information; that is, each individual knows his or her own
marginal rate of substitution, but not those of the other members of the group. Adopting
a Bayesian mechanism design framework, we assume that the distribution of marginal
rates of substitution is common knowledge.
We are interested in characterizing efficiency in this environment and are also
interested in characterizing those mechanisms that one might expect to actually arise in
practice. This suggests two approaches, one from normative considerations and one from
Žpositive considerations. On the normative side, we ask: What should an active planner a
.mechanism designer do? A well-known special case of this problem has been solved for
Ž Ž ..one particular social welfare function e.g., d’Aspremont and Gerard-Varet 1979 that is´
insensitive to the distribution of cost shares. What distinguishes our work here is that we
consider a planner who is maximizing a welfare function that is sensitive to the allocation
of cost shares over the different valuation-types. Simply put, the planner may care who
pays. This is represented formally by type-contingent welfare weights.
Why might the consideration of such distributional goals be relevant? What rationale
can be given for nonconstant welfare weights? Perhaps the simplest example to answer
these questions corresponds to public decisions with zero production costs. Such cases
are well-approximated in the real world by social legislation such as blue laws, smoking
and drinking prohibitions, clothing requirements at beaches, and so forth. Suppose one is
considering the implementation of one such social regulation. Many would argue that if
Žimplementation takes place, then the losers i.e. those with a negative valuation to the
1We are grateful for the support of the National Science Foundation Grant No. SBR-9223701,
and of the New Millennium Program of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory of NASA. The second author
is grateful for the hospitality and research support at Laboratoire d’Economie Industrielle and at
Centre d’Enseignement et de Recherche en Analyse Socio-Economique. An early draft of this
article was prepared for the 1996 Francqui Prize Colloquium. We are grateful to its organizer,
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. 2 Žproposed regulation should be compensated. But one runs into the incentive compati-
.bility problem that if you naively say you are going to compensate all losers, then
everyone will claim to be a loser, possibly leading to production never occurring. A
planner might want, therefore, to give some weight to the losers but not to the exclusion
of all others. Obviously, in order to compensate the losers in such decisions, incentive
taxes need to be carefully constructed that will achieve such type-contingent redistribu-
tion, at least to the extent limited by incentive compatibility constraints. As we will show
below, there is a direct and intuitive link between the desired degree of such compensa-
tion and the corresponding distortions away from the Lindahl-Samuelson optimum. In
this particular example, significant compensation of losers would necessitate a corre-
sponding degree of underproduction relative to the classic solution. Other weighting
schemes would correspond to other type-distributional goals, and could lead to either
under- or overproduction.
A second reason to consider nonconstant welfare weights arises if one concedes that
this partial equilibrium model is embedded in a richer general equilibrium structure,
where income or wealth distribution is a goal of the planner. If preferences for the public
good are correlated with income or wealth in a systematic way, then the public good
mechanism can be used as an instrument for redistribution, and unequal welfare weights
would be a reflection of the planner’s redistributive goals.
A third rationale for unequal weights is more direct. For reasons that may have to do
only remotely with issues of compensating losers or wealth redistribution, certain kinds of
type-dependent cost-sharing may be deemed desirable on their own merits. A classic
example of this is the class of proportional cost-sharing rules, whereby individuals valuing
Žthe public good more should bear a proportionally larger share of the costs e.g., Jackson
Ž ..and Moulin 1992 . Such normative goals would correspond to a system of welfare
weights that decrease in valuations in a particular way.
For the positive approach to the mechanism design problem, we ask: What would we
expect to see in practice? Here we are looking for a concept of efficiency or stability
because one would expect inefficient or unstable mechanisms to be replaced by others.
Under complete information, these concepts correspond to Pareto optimality and the
core, respectively. Under asymmetric information the problem is a bit more subtle, and
there remains no true consensus on the appropriate equivalent concepts.3 We therefore
take a minimalist approach, and look at a natural extension of Pareto optimality to
asymmetric information. In the analysis below we assume that all decisions, including
whether to change the mechanism, are made at the interim stagethat is, when each
agent knows his or her type, but not anyone else’s type. If there is no communication,
then the set of interim incentive efficient mechanisms consists of those incentive
compatible mechanisms for which it cannot be common knowledge that there is another
mechanism which generates a unanimous improvement. We would expect therefore that
surviving institutions would be, minimally, interim incentive efficient.
Luckily we do not have to choose between normative and positive approaches to this
Ž .problem. As pointed out in Holmstrom and Myerson 1983 , a mechanism is interim¨
efficient if and only if there exist type-dependent social welfare weights for which that
mechanism solves the planner’s optimization problem subject to feasibility and incentive
compatibility constraints. Thus, by varying the welfare weights in our planner’s problem,
2Sometimes, this requirement is implicitly imposed as a voluntary participation constraint.
3 Ž . Ž . Ž .See Holmstrom and Myerson 1983 , Cramton and Palfrey 1995 , and Crawford 1985 for good
discussions of the difficulties of extending these concepts to asymmetric information.
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we map out the entire set of mechanisms that are interim incentive efficient. Thus, a
complete solution to this problem, posed either from a normative or positive standpoint,
is equivalent to fully characterizing the set of interim efficient mechanisms for the
production of public goods in this framework.
A complete characterization of interim efficiency has been done for the special case
Žwhere the types are identically distributed and can only take on two values Ledyard and
Ž ..Palfrey 1994 . There it was shown that optimal production always takes a special form
in which the public good is provided if and only if the number of high valuation types
exceeds a threshold number that depends on the welfare weights and the distribution of
types. The greater the welfare weight on high valuation types, the lower the optimal
Ž .threshold. With more than two types as in this paper the optimal mechanism generally
depends on the exact profile of types in a more complicated way. In this paper, we fully
characterize interim efficient mechanisms and obtain some comparative statics about
how the optimal mechanism changes with the underlying distribution of types and with
the welfare weights of the welfare function.
Section 2 presents the basic model. Section 3 presents the characterization and its
proof. Section 4 explains the intuition behind the characterization. In Section 5, we
summarize these findings and offer some concluding remarks about some possible future
directions of research.
2. THE MODEL
There are N people who must decide on the quantity, q, of a public good that is
produced according to constant returns to scale4 and has a maximum level Y1. The
 cost of producing q 0, 1 is equal to Kq. In addition, they must decide how to distribute
the production costs. Because of the linear production technology, the optimal level of
the public good will always be either 0 or 1, so this is equivalent to a problem of deciding
on whether or not to produce a discrete public good. We let ai denote individuals i’s
share of the cost, in units of the consumption of the private good, and assume it can take
any real value. Therefore the set of feasible levels of production and cost shares are given
by
Ž 1 N . N  a , . . . , a , q   0, 1
such that
N
iKq a .Ý
i1
Individual preferences are assumed to be risk-neutral and quasilinear in the level of
Ž . ipublic good production and the taxes cost shares , so the utility to type  of agent i for
Ž .an allocation q, a is given by
V i iqai.
Thus,  i represents the marginal rate of substitution between the public and private
good. We refer to  i as player i’s ‘‘value.’’ We assume that each individual knows his own
value,  i, and does not know the values of the other individuals. We assume that the
4We explain in the next section how the model and the results are easily extended to arbitrary
production technologies.
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Ž i. Ž .individual values  are independently distributed, with the common knowledge cdf of
i i i i iŽ .  i’s value denoted F  and the support of F is V   ,  , where  KN . Wei i
assume F has a continuous positive density on V i. Note that  i0 is allowed.i
Clearly under these assumptions, our choice of normalization of the utility function is
Žarbitrary up to an affine transformation. In particular, it is equivalent in terms of
.individual decision theory to the models of asymmetric information about contribution
Ž i. 5costs a , where utilities are normalized so that the marginal utility of the public good
Ž . i Ž i. i equals 1, so that u q 1 a . However, the class of ex-ante incentive efficient
Ž Ž ..mechanisms in the sense of Holmstrom and Myerson 1983 will be different under the¨
two normalizations.6 So, below, we will focus on the set of interim-incentive efficient
Ž .mechanisms. That set is independent of whatever type dependent normalization one
chooses.
A mechanism consists of a message space for each agent and an outcome function
mapping message profiles into probability distributions over the set of feasible alloca-
Ž .tions. By the revelation principle, the properties in terms of allocations of any optimal
mechanism can be duplicated by an incentive compatible, direct mechanism in which the
Ž .message space for agent i is simply the set of possible types values in the support of F .i
A strategy for i is a mapping  i: V iV i, that is, a decision rule that specifies a reported
type for each possible type. We refer to the identity mapping as the truthful strategy. By
the linearity of the individual utility functions, there is also no loss of generality in
restricting attention to deterministic mechanisms. Thus, we denote a feasible direct
mechanism simply as a function
N
N 1 N N iŽ .   : V  a , . . . , a , q R  0, 1 a 	Kq .Ý½ 5
i1
Ž .We denote the public good allocation component of  at type profile  by q  , and
iŽ .the private good tax for i by a  .
Besides feasibility, the main restriction on  is that it be incentie compatible, which
means that it is a Bayesian equilibrium of  for all agents to adopt a strategy of truthfully
reporting their type. Given a strategy profile  i: V iV i and a mechanism, , let the
interim utility of type  i of agent i, assuming all others truthfully report their type, be
denoted by:
iŽ i i .  i Ž iŽ i . i . iŽ iŽ i . i . Ž  i .u  ,  ,    q   ,  a   ,  dF   .ˆ H
iV
iŽ i. iŽ i . Ž .Let u ,  u ,  , I where I denotes the truthful strategy I   . Then  isˆ
iŽ i. iŽ i i. i iincentive compatible if and only if u ,  	u ,  ,  for all  ,  .ˆ
The set of interim incentive efficient allocation rules7 can be represented as the
solutions to a set of maximization problems. Let 0 be a system of welfare weights, a
profile of measurable functions mapping types into the positive real line such that
 i Ž i. Ž i. Ž i. iiH   dF  1  i, where   represents the welfare weight assigned to type  of i i i
5This normalization can be made as long as  i0.
6The fact that ex ante efficiency is sensitive to utility normalizations is discussed in Ledyard and
Ž .Palfrey 1994, p. 333 .
7For the remainder, we simply refer to such allocations as ‘‘interim efficient.’’
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agent i. Then  is interim efficient if and only if there is a  such that  maximizes
i i i i i 8Ž . Ž . Ž .iÝ H   u ,  dF  over the set of feasible and incentive compatible mechanisms.i  i i
We now proceed to characterize this set.
3. THE CHARACTERIZATION
As indicated above, we represent interim efficient rules as a solution to a constrained
maximization problem. First we need to identify incentive compatible mechanisms in a
useful way.
For smooth mechanisms, when preferences are linear, the characterization of incentive
compatibility in terms of derivatives is well-known. There are basically two features of
such mechanisms. First, an envelope condition is satisfied, namely that the total deriva-
tive of the interim utility for i with respect to type when players adopt truthful strategies
Ž .is equal to the partial derivative with respect to type i.e., fixing the reports of all agents .
Second, the interim utility to i under truthful reporting is convex in i’s type. This is
stated formally below, without proof.
Ž Ž .. i iLEMMA Rochet 1987 : If u is linear in  and  is twice continuously differentiable,ˆ
then  is incentie compatible if and only if
Ž . iŽ i . iŽ i .i ii  u  ,   u  ,  , I ,ˆ 
Ž . iŽ i . iii u  ,  is conex in  .
iŽ i. Ž i. Ž . Ž  i. i ii  iFor our problem  u ,  Q  H q  dF   . So u is convex in  if and i V
Ž i. i Ž .only if Q  	0  . Using these facts we can see that a mechanism q, a is interimi
Ž . Ž i.Ž i Ž .efficient if and only if there is a  such that q, a solves max H Ý    q  V i i
iŽ .. Ž . Ž . Ž i. i iŽ i. iŽ i . ii ia  dF  subject to 0q  1  , Q  	0  i,  , u   u  , I  i,  ,ˆi  
iŽ . Ž .and Ý a  Kq   .i
Ž . Ž .Using the approach of Mirrlees 1971 and Wilson 1993 we construct the Lagrangian
equivalent problem
i i i i iŽ . Ž . Ž .max min   u  ,  dF HÝ i ii 	 , 
 i
i i i i i i iŽ .  Ž . Ž . i i
 	  u  ,  u  ,  , I dˆHÝ i  ii
iŽ . Ž . Ž .
 
  a  Kq  d subject to:H Ý
V i
Ž .0q  1 V ,
 i i iŽ .Q  	0  i ,  V ,i
Ž .where 	 and 
 are multipliers for first order incentive compatibility and feasibility,i
iŽ i.respectively. Applying Green’s Theorem and substituting the identity u ,  
8 Ž .See Holmstrom and Myerson 1983 .
J. O. LEDYARD AND T. R. PALFREY440
iŽ i .u ,  , I converts the maximization problem to:ˆ
i i i i i i Ž .  Ž . Ž . Ž .max min u  ,  , I   f  	 ˆHÝ i i ii 	 , 
 i
Ž i . i Ž i .4 i Ž . iŽ . Ž .i	  u  ,  , I d 
 
  a  Kq  dˆ H Ýi  ž /
V i
iŽ i . Ž i . Ž i . i
 u  ,  , I 	    d subject to:ˆHÝ i iiVi
Ž .0q  1 V ,
 i i iŽ .Q  	0  i ,  V ,i
where V i denotes the boundary of V i and  points outward at  i.i
We are now in a position to give a complete characterization of the class of interim
efficient mechanisms.
Ž  .THEOREM 1: q , a is an interim efficient mechanism if and only if 0 with
i i i iŽ . Ž .iH   dF  1  i, such that:
Ž . Ž .  iŽ i. 4a  , q  maximizes Ý w  K subject to:i
Ž .0q  1 V ,
 i i iŽ .Q  	0  i ,  V , wherei
ii  i iŽ . Ž . Ž .i1F  H  t dF ti  i ii i iŽ .w    
 ;i iŽ . Ž .f  f i i
Ž .  iŽ .  i i  Ž i. iŽ .iand b a  H t dQ t 
  where i
 i i i iŽ . Ž . Ž .  Kq   t dQ t  andHÝ Ý iii i

i i iŽ . Ž  .  dF   0  i ,  .Hi 
Ž .PROOF: A sketch is given. For further details see Ledyard and Palfrey 1996 .
i i iŽ . Ž .iNotice that the restriction of  to H   dF  1  i is without loss of generality. i
Since utilities are linear in the transfers, for some welfare weights total welfare can be
made arbitrarily large simply by making ex ante transfers from one individual to another
individual. That is, if, for two agents i and j, it were the case that
i j i i j jŽ . Ž . Ž . Ž .  dF     dF  ,H Hi i j ji j 
then total welfare could be made arbitrarily large by making ex ante transfers of the
private good from i to j. Thus, a solution to the maximization problem only exists when
the welfare weights are, in expectation, the same for all agents. Thus, without loss of
generality, we restrict the welfare weights to satisfy
i Ž . Ž . s dF s 1  i .H i ii
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Ž.We can write as
 i iŽ . Ž .	  	 i i i i iŽ . Ž . Ž Ž . Ž .. Ž . Ž .maxmin     q  a   q  dF H Ý i i iž /Ž . Ž .f  f 	 , 
 V i ii
i i i i i iŽ . Ž . Ž .  Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .
 
  a  Kq  d
 	  u  	  u  .ˆ ˆH Ý Ý i iž /
V i i
iŽ . Ž . Ž i.From the first order conditions with respect to a  , 
  , and 	  we obtain, fori
i i i   ,
Ž . Ž Ž i . Ž i .  Ž i .. Ž . Ž i .1    f  	  
  f  0,i i i i
Ž .0, if   0,i iŽ . Ž . Ž .2 a  Kq Ý ½ Ž .	0 if   0,i

 i i i i i iŽ . Ž . Ž  . Ž . Ž .3 a  dF   A   Q   i , H i ii i  V
Ž . Ž . Ž .where   
  f  .
Ž . Ž . iŽ i.From 1 it follows that  is constant in  . Integration of 1 gives 	  
Ž i.Ž Ž i. . Ž i.F     
C where   is the expected value of  conditional on i’si i i i
valuation being less than or equal to  i.
Ž . 9 Ž . Ž .Part b of the theorem follows from 2 and 3 .
i i iFinally, the continuity of 	 along with the first order conditions for a at  and i
ii i  i iŽ . Ž . Ž . Ž .iimply that 	  	  0. So C0 and H   dF  1. Substituting all ofi i  i i
Ž. this into implies that we must find q to solve
iŽ .	 ii Ž . Ž .max   K q  dF  subject to:H Ý iž /Ž .f q ii
Ž .0q  1 V ,
Q.E.D. i i iŽ .Q  	0  i ,  V .i
REMARK: The technique above applies equally to the case of general production
Ž .functions. Let C q be the cost of producing a public good level equal to q. First observe
Ž .that the incentive compatibility constraints do not depend on C q . As a consequence,
substitution of the incentive constraints results in the program:
iŽ .	 ii Ž . Ž . Ž .max   q  C q dF  subject to:H Ý iž /Ž .f q ii
 Ž i . i iQ  	0  i ,  V .i
9The existence of such an  for any given q was first shown by d’Aspremont and Gerard-Varet´
Ž . Ž .1979 . One  that satisfies b is
K 1 1 j   i i jŽ . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .   q  Q  
 Q V  s dQ s .HÝ Ýi j j j jjN N1 N1 ji j i
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The only regularity assumptions needed to guarantee a solution are that C is nondecreas-
ing in q and that
iŽ .	 ii Ž . Ž .  q  C qÝ iž /Ž .f ii
has a solution for every valuation profile,  . The corresponding taxes are then con-
Ž .structed in a manner similar to part b of the theorem. Therefore, this general approach
can be applied to problems with increasing or decreasing returns to scale, U-shaped
average cost functions, and even lumpy public goods10 with fixed costs and ‘‘jumps’’ in
the cost function.
4. INTERPRETING THE CHARACTERIZATION
4.1. Virtual Cost-Benefit Criterion
Call
Ž .F i ii Ž . Ž Ž . .w      1 ,i i i iŽ .f i i
i Ž . 11 Ž i. itype  of agent i’s irtual aluation a la Myerson . Suppose w  	0  i,  . Then,` i
Ž i. Ž Ž j. Ž i.. Ž i.since Q  prob Ý w  	Kw  it will be true that Q  	0 is neveri j i j i i
Ž . Ž i. i  Ž .binding. So for , F such that w  	0  i,  , interim efficient q  satisfyi
 Ž . iŽ i .q  1 if w  	K ,Ý
i
0 otherwise.
This is a irtual cost-benefit criterion.12 The virtual utility has a familiar interpretation
Ž Ž ..see, for example, Myerson 1981 . It equals the ‘‘true’’ public good valuation of the
 i-type inflated13 by a factor that depends on the distribution of types and on the welfare
Ž i. iweights. The benchmark case is the one where   1 for all i and  . In this case thei
first best optimal level of public good is 1 or 0 depending only on whether or not
 i Ž .Ý   KN 	0. That is, produce if and only if the sum of the marginal rates ofi
substitution exceeds the marginal production cost. This is the Lindahl-Samuelson solu-
tion, precisely the solution investigated in most previous papers on the optimal provision
Ž Ž . .of public good. See d’Aspremont and Gerard-Varet 1979 . This simplification arises´
Žbecause the allocation of the private good i.e., the incidence of the taxes on different
.types does not affect social welfare. For this reason, incentive compatibility does not
reduce social welfare relative to the first best solution. However, it must be emphasized
10These are sometimes referred to as threshold or step-level public goods. The simplest kind is
just a binary public good, which is mathematically equivalent to the standard model presented in
Section 2: constant returns with a maximum capacity.
11This is the so-called ‘‘regular’’ case, where the second order condition is never binding.
12 Ž .Notice that similar ex post virtual cost-benefit conditions characterize the second-best opti-
mum in the case of nonlinear production technologies, provided the second order condition is
satisfied.
13 Ž i.This could be deflated if   1.i
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that this is a very special case. It is in fact the only system of welfare weights where
incentive compatibility does not cause distortions relative to the first best solution.14
To better understand the intuition behind the virtual valuations, one can think of the
Ž .mechanism operating in the following way. Each agent truthfully reports a valuation. If
the public good is produced, then each agent pays the incentive tax, which equals a
Ž Ž i.. Ž i.constant plus that agent’s valuation minus his ‘‘informational rent,’’ 1F  f  .i i
Recall from standard incentive theory that this is the amount that can be extracted from
an agent, given incentive constraints. Of course, in this public good problem, the
objective of the mechanism is not to extract rent from agents, so any excess incentive tax
will be distributed lump sum back to the agents, by adjusting the incentive tax by a
constant. Thus, if the good is provided, the government spends K to produce the public
Žgood and makes a lump-sum refund, which is formally captured by the constant i.e.
i.independent of  that is added to each agent’s incentive tax. The portion of this refund
that comes from type  i of agent i equals
Ž i .1F  Kii   .iž /Ž . Nf i
There are two other terms that complete the social costbenefit picture, as it concerns
type  i of agent i. One is simply that producing the public good, produces a direct benefit
i Ž i. iof  to agent i, which is valued socially as    . Last, but not least, is the fact thati
Ž .the incentive tax before refund is a social cost, and this social cost equals
i i iŽ . Ž .iH  t dF t i ii iŽ .    .i iŽ .f i
Collecting all these terms, gives us type  i of agent i’s contribution to the marginal net
i iŽ .social value of producing the public good. Denoting this by w  , gives us
i i i iŽ . Ž . Ž .iH  t dF t 1F  K i i ii i i i i i iŽ . Ž . Ž .w          
   i i i iŽ . Ž . Nf  f i i
ii  i iŽ . Ž . Ž .i1F  H  t dF t Ki  i ii  
 i iŽ . Ž . Nf  f i i
K
i iŽ .w   ,
N
which is the cost adjusted virtual valuation of type  i of agent i.
i i iŽ . Ž .iNotice that in the special case of neutral distributional weights, H  t dF t 1 i i
Ž i.F  , so thati
i i i iŽ . Ž . Ž .iH  t dF t 1F  i i ii i iŽ .     i i iŽ . Ž .f  f i i
14Actually, this is the only system of welfare weights for which a first best solution exists. For any
other weights, welfare can be arbitrarily increased by shifting the allocation of the private good to
one particular type of some individual. Since we impose no feasibility bounds on the allocation of
the private good, this means that the first best solution does not exist. Of course, with incentive
compatibility constraints, the second-best problem is well defined.
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and as a result there are no welfare costs associated with charging the incentive taxes in a
type-dependent way and then redistributing them back in a lump sum fashion. Otherwise
there is a cost to doing this.
The form of virtual utilities also makes it easy to see how distortions away from the
classic optimum are related to the welfare weights. For example, if  is decreasing ini
type then generally the interim efficient solution calls for underproduction relative to the
Ž i.Lindahl-Samuelson solution, since 	  is positive for all types. That is, the virtuali
valuations are always less than true valuations, so the sum of the true valuations must
more than exceed the production cost in order for production to be optimal. Conversely,
if  is increasing in type, then there should be oerproduction relative to the Lindahl-i
Samuelson solution.
4.2. Second Order Conditions
The discussion above assumes monotone virtual utilities, which ensures that maximiza-
iŽ i.tion of the relaxed program, without the Q  	0 constraint, automatically satisfies
that constraint. It is straightforward to see what is required for virtual utilities to be
monotone in type, and this provides a nice intuition for how our results differ from
Ž Ž ..standard incentive problems of this type e.g. Guesnerie and Laffont 1984 . From above,
ii  i iŽ . Ž . Ž .i1F  H  t dF ti  i iiw   
 .i i iŽ . Ž .f  f i i
i i Ž .The first term,  , is clearly increasing in  . The second term, 1F f , the
informational rent, is typically assumed to be monotone in  i in adverse selection models
in private goods environments, by requiring the distribution to satisfy a monotone hazard
rate condition.
Since the incidence of incentive taxes can have welfare effects, there is a third term to
Ž .worry about, indicating that one may need more or sometimes less! than the standard
Ž i.monotone hazard rate condition to guarantee that Q  	0 is automatically satisfiedi
when one simply plugs in virtual utilities and maximizes subject only to production
feasibility. These additional conditions will imply restrictions on the distribution of
welfare weights, as we illustrate in the example below.
4.3. Example
  Ž . Ž .Let  be distributed uniformly on 0, 1 for all i, so F   and f  1. Then
Ž .  Ž .  Ž .w  2H  t dt and w 2  . Therefore, the second order condition is globally0
satisfied for uniform distributions of valuations if the maximum welfare weight is less
Ž . Ž . Ž .than or equal to 2. Thus, if   2 a
b  2a
b , where a	0 and 2a
b0, then
we are always in the ‘‘regular’’ case where virtual valuations are monotonic in type and
Žthe second order conditions are satisfied. If b0 high valuation types receive more
.weight then production will occur more often than in the Lindahl-Samuelson solution,
while if b0, the reverse is true. However, there are  such that virtual valuations are
Ž . 2decreasing, even for the uniform distribution. For example, if   3 , then virtual
'valuations are decreasing for  23 . The optimal solution in this case will involve
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equal treatment of all types with valuations above some 1; Qi1 for all such
types.15
If K1, the solution above is straightforward, because the Q obtained from thei
relaxed problem is in fact weakly increasing, even though the virtual valuations are
decreasing in some region.16 The reason why Q obtained from the relaxed problem isi
nondecreasing is that virtual valuations are decreasing only for very high values of  ,
Ž . Ž .where w  1. So, when K1, the relaxed solution sets Q 1 whenever w  1 fori
at least one agent, and all these high types are treated the same. But in general, for
higher values of K, the relaxed solution may produce violations of the second order
conditioni.e. Q decreasing in some region. In such cases, one applies a procedurei
Ž Ž ..called ironing Rochet and Chone 1998 . The principle behind this procedure is to´
Ž .flatten out Q in the decreasing region and for some adjacent types as well . Thei
Ž .geometry is illustrated clearly in a series of figures in Guesnerie and Laffont 1984 for
the single agent case.
It is also instructive to use this example to illustrate the range of public good provision
Ž .rules or cost-benefit criteria that are interim efficient. Suppose N2, K1. The
Lindahl-Samuelson efficient outcome is to produce if and only if the average valuation
exceeds 12, so the public good will be provided half the time.
Next suppose one shifts welfare weight to the low valuation types, to the point where
Ž . Ž .  2 for all 12 and   0 for all 12. This satisfies monotonicity of
virtual valuations17 and it is easy to see that the optimal mechanism is to produce if and
only if the sum of valuations exceeds 32. In other words, this weighting scheme
effectively inflates the cost of the public good by 50 percent, so it should be produced
only if the actual benefitcost ratio exceeds 1.5. At first blush it seems as though this
mechanism could be improved, since there are some states where both agents are ‘‘high’’
Ž .types i.e. 12 for both of them , and the public good is not provided. Since all high
types receive the same welfare weight, and since low types do not bear any of the cost of
production in these states, it would seem to lead to an improvement in welfare. Why
doesn’t this lead to an improvement? The answer is that the mechanism is designed to
achieve redistributive goals in addition to deciding on public good production. In this
case, the welfare weights indicate that there should be a transfer from high valuation to
low valuation types. Hence in the optimal mechanism there are some states where there
is one low type and one high type, and the public good is not produced, but a private
good transfer takes place between the low and high types. The extent of such transfers
would be hindered by greater public good production due to incentive compatibility
problems. We conjecture that this choice of welfare weights corresponds to the lowest
Ž .possible expected output Q .125 of all interim efficient mechanisms for the uniform
case with N2 and K1.
15 Ž . Ž .2Similarly, if   3 1 the optimal solution will involve equal treatment of all types with
valuations below some 0; Q 0 for all such types.i
16 In other words, this is an example demonstrating why monotonicity of w is not a necessary
condition for the second order conditions to be satisfied.
17 Ž .If one shifts the welfare weights even further downward, so that   A2 for all 1A
Ž .and   0 for all 1A, then the virtual valuations are nonmonotonic and ironing must be
done. Nevertheless, from the characterization in Theorem 1, it is easy to verify that standard ironing
procedures can be used and will generate an optimal mechanism with the same property: produce if
and only if the sum of valuations exceeds 32.
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At the other extreme, suppose the welfare weights are shifted in the opposite
Ž . Ž .direction, with   2 for all 12 and   0 for all 12. In this case the
optimal mechanism is to produce if and only if the sum of valuations exceeds 12. In
other words, the cost of the public good is effectively deflated by 50 percent, so that it
should be produced if the actual benefitcost ratio is at least .5. Again it would seem that
efficiency would dictate that when both types are ‘‘low’’ types, the good should never be
produced. However, redistributive goals implied by this welfare weighting scheme require
the low types to subsidize the cost of the public good. The most efficient way to perform
this subsidization requires some ‘‘overproduction’’ of the public good. We conjecture that
this choice of welfare weights corresponds to the highest possible expected output
Ž .Q .875 of all interim efficient mechanisms for the uniform case with N2 and K1.
5. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have characterized the interim efficient public good allocation rules
in a simple Bayesian public good environment. We find that the optimal mechanism
involves either more or less production of the public good depending on whether the
welfare weights are shifted in the direction of types with higher or lower valuations for
the public good. Thus, compared to the classical optimal level of public good provision
Ž .the ‘‘Lindahl-Samuelson’’ solution , there should generally be some distortion. The
reason for this distortion is that unless welfare weights are perfectly neutral, efficient
allocations will depend in general on both the level of public good and the incidence of
taxes to finance the public good. Because of incentive compatibility, the efficient way to
Ž .reduce the tax burden on low-valuation resp: high-valuation consumers is to reduce
Ž .resp: increase the level of provision of the public good. In the borderline case, the
first-best solution is attainable only because the welfare function is independent of
distribution of the private good.
There are several directions worth pursuing. One direction is to explore the use of
simple mechanisms. The public good mechanisms proposed here involve complicated
transfer schemes that can necessitate the use of very large taxes and subsidies. In a
Ž Ž ..companion paper Ledyard and Palfrey 1998 we explore simple mechanisms in large
populations, and show that for any interim efficient allocation rule there exists a simple
dominant-strategy referendum mechanism that perfectly approximates the efficiency of
Žthat allocation rule. In a referendum, individuals simply submit a binary message a
.‘‘vote’’ either for or against production of the public good. If a sufficiently large fraction
of the individuals vote in favor, then the public good is provided and the costs are
distributed equally in the population. Otherwise, the public good is not produced. This
provides an approximate ‘‘welfare theorem’’ for public goods: efficient allocation rules
Ž .can be approximately decentralized by an appropriately chosen voting rule. Moreover, if
there is a common value component to the distribution of preferences, then the optimal
referendum is unique. We prove this by approximating the solution to the optimal
mechanism where the second order condition is ignored. Thus a by-product is the result
that the second order conditions are inconsequential in large economies.
There are several other directions. Participation constraints were not imposed in our
solution for the optimum. It is fairly easy to show that when these constraints are
binding, this implies a reduction in the level of the public good, since these constraints
Ž Ž ..are necessarily binding on the low valuation types Ledyard and Palfrey 1994 . It is also
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true that, except in uninteresting cases, these constraints will imply Q 0 in largeN
Ž Ž . Ž ..populations Ledyard and Palfrey 1994 , Mailath and Postlewaite 1990 . But for the
case of large N, it would usually seem more realistic to assume that participation is
generally obligatory to all members of the group under consideration, as we have
assumed here. Related to the general issue of participation is the application of the
general approach presented here to excludable public goods. In that case, participation
Ž .constraints can be relaxed by the no-cost exclusion of low valuation types.
More involved extensions, such as relaxing the assumption of independent types,
consideration of utility functions where the valuation parameter enters nonlinearly, or
introducing multidimensional types, appear to be more difficult open questions. Finally,
as we remarked at the end of Section 3, the analysis is easily extended to accommodate
arbitrary production technologies.
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